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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 05-1696
BAO YING CHEN;
JIN BAO LIU,
Petitioners
v.
ALBERTO GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Respondents

On Petition for Review of a Final Decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA Nos. A72-432-397 & A77-713-720

Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 31, 2006
Before: SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges,
and ACKERMAN, District Judge*
(Filed: April 6, 2006)

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
*

The Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.

Bao Ying Chen, the lead petitioner, and her husband, Jin Bao Liu, petition for
review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the
denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of Chen’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ exercised
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b). The BIA possessed jurisdiction under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). We conduct our review consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
Chen seeks asylum on the basis of political persecution because of her opposition
to China’s coercive family planning policy. She testified that she and Liu were married in
1981 and had a son in 1982. After the birth of their son, she claimed that an intra-uterine
device (“IUD”) was forcibly inserted. Despite the IUD, Chen became pregnant in 1985.
At two months, this pregnancy, according to Chen’s testimony, was forcibly aborted.
Although another IUD was inserted, Chen testified that she became pregnant again in
December 1990. Because she and Liu wanted to keep this child, Chen went into hiding
and Liu came to the United States. By her account, she successfully hid for eight to nine
months, until family planning officials found her and forcibly took her to the hospital and
aborted the child. After this incident, Chen tried to come to the United States on several
occasions, finally succeeding in February of 1999. Subsequently, in December of 1999,
Chen delivered a daughter.
The IJ found that neither Chen nor Liu were credible. He pointed out that Chen’s
asylum application failed to mention that she had a forced abortion in 1985. Although
Chen explained that she did not include this incident because the procedure was
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performed in a clinic and she did not have a certificate, the IJ did not find the explanation
satisfactory in light of the significance of such an event.
The IJ also considered suspect the claim of a forced abortion in 1985 because Liu
did not mention it in his asylum application, which was filed shortly after his arrival in
1991. In fact, Liu’s application also failed to mention that Chen was again pregnant and
hiding from family planning officials. Instead, the application falsely claimed that,
contrary to the one child family planning policy, he had a second son born in 1989. For
her part, Chen declared during the hearing before the IJ that she had not delivered a
second child in 1989.
The IJ was not satisfied that Chen’s 1990 pregnancy was forcibly aborted. He
noted that her testimony and the certificate she produced relative to the procedure
indicated that the pregnancy was almost full term and that efforts had been taken to save
the life of the mother and child. Chen testified that she was taken to the hospital and that
a procedure was done. The following day, according to her testimony, the doctor advised
that a caesarean section would be performed if she was unable to deliver the baby. The
certificate Chen submitted in support of her claim stated that labor was induced, but that
the womb was not “open[ing] up” and that there were symptoms of “womb rupture.” The
certificate further read: “caesarean section was performed to complete the induced labor
procedure. A male baby was born dead.” In light of this testimonial and documentary
evidence, the IJ concluded Chen had not been subjected to a forcible abortion. As
additional support for disbelieving Chen’s claim that she was forced to abort her
3

pregnancy, the IJ also cited Liu’s failure to amend his asylum application to include this
significant event at the heart of petitioners’ claim for asylum.
Both Chen and Liu testified that they feared persecution if they returned to China.
The IJ found the credence of this claimed fear to be undermined by the fact that Liu had
tried to return to China on two occasions to visit his wife.
The IJ denied Chen’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the CAT. Chen appealed, challenging the adverse credibility finding. The BIA
affirmed. It noted that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was based on “material,
unexplained inconsistencies and omissions in the testimony describing the circumstances
surrounding the alleged abortion.” As support for its decision, the BIA cited Chen’s
testimony about her abortions, documentary evidence from the record, and Liu’s asylum
application. The BIA explained that Chen had not offered a convincing explanation for
the discrepancies and declared that “we are not left with the definite and firm conviction
that the Immigration Judge’s finding is clearly erroneous.” Accordingly, Chen’s appeal
to the BIA was dismissed.
Chen filed a timely petition for review. Because the BIA cited some of the
inconsistencies and also relied on the IJ’s finding, we have jurisdiction to review both the
BIA’s and the IJ’s opinions. Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). Our
review is limited as the “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B). This standard requires that the agency findings be supported by
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substantial evidence. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). In
Dia, we reiterated that the substantial evidence standard also applies to adverse credibility
determinations and that “specific, cogent reasons” should be given for finding a witness
not credible. Id. (quoting Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The “reasons must bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.”
Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1998). While inconsistencies may
warrant an adverse credibility determination, the inconsistencies should “involve the
‘heart of the asylum claim.’” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (quoting Ceballos-Castillo v. INS,
904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Here, after a careful review of the record, we find no error by the BIA or the IJ.
The inconsistencies identified by the IJ and the BIA are supported by the record and they
relate to the heart of Chen’s claim that she was persecuted on the basis of her opposition
to China’s family planning policy. Because there is substantial evidence to support the
adverse credibility finding as to both Chen and Liu, we will deny the petition for review.
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